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NOTES







This Note examines the Alaska Supreme Court’s nascent inter-
pretation of Alaska’s anti-discrimination statute in sexual harass-
ment cases.  The Note begins by analyzing the history of sexual
harassment case law in Alaska.  The Note then discusses the bene-
fits of applying the “reasonable victim” standard in the Alaska
Supreme Court’s determinations of the offensiveness of an em-
ployer’s conduct by analyzing relevant law review articles, federal
sexual harassment decisions, and a comparison of three recent
Alaska Supreme Court decisions.  The Note next discusses the im-
portance of allowing Alaska employers an affirmative defense to
vicarious liability for the sexual harassment perpetrated by their
employees.  The author concludes that the Alaska Supreme Court
should adopt a “reasonable victim” standard for determinations
of the offensiveness of an employer’s conduct and allow employ-
ers an affirmative defense to sexual harassment claims.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Most state courts have extensive case law that guides their in-
terpretation of state anti-discrimination statutes in sexual harass-
ment cases.  By contrast, the Alaska Supreme Court began its in-
terpretation of what conduct constitutes sexual harassment under
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Alaska Statutes section 18.80.220(a)1 only in 1996 with French v.
Jadon, Inc.2  In French, the supreme court noted that it would not
decide whether to adopt the “reasonable victim” standard, but in a
footnote discussing this issue, the court cited sources that mostly
adopted some kind of individualized standard for reasonableness
determinations.3  In order to fulfill the Alaska Supreme Court’s
goal of shaping the future of Alaska sexual harassment law, this
Note proposes that the Alaska Supreme Court adopt the “reason-
able victim” standard in determinations of the offensiveness of an
employer’s conduct.  The “reasonable victim” standard would im-
prove upon the existing “reasonable person” standard by including
the victim’s gender in the analysis.  Male victims of sexual harass-
ment would be assessed under a “reasonable male” standard, while
female victims would be assessed under a “reasonable woman”
standard.  Second, this Note proposes that the Alaska Supreme
Court allow Alaska employers to assert a two-pronged affirmative
defense to vicarious liability for the sexual harassment claims of
their employees.  A similar defense was adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth4 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.5  These two proposals would allow
the Alaska Supreme Court to adhere more closely to the Alaska
Legislature’s goal by giving a “broader interpretation”6 to Alaska
Statutes section 18.80.220 than its federal counterpart Title VII,7 in
furthering the goal of the state of Alaska to eradicate sexual har-
assment from the workplace.  The incorporation of the “reasonable
victim” standard and an affirmative defense for Alaska employers
would also help to prevent harm to female victims of sexual har-
1. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a) (LEXIS 1998).  The statute makes it
unlawful for
(1) an employer to refuse employment to a person, or to bar a person
from employment, or to discriminate against a person in compensation
or in a term, condition, or privilege of employment because of the per-
son’s race, religion, color, or national origin, or because of the person’s
age, physical or mental disability, sex, marital status, changes in marital
status, pregnancy, or parenthood when the reasonable demands of the
position do not require distinction on the basis of age, physical or mental
disability, sex, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, or
parenthood.
Id.
2. 911 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1996).
3. See id. at 28-29 n.10 (citing numerous federal decisions and law review ar-
ticles discussing the adoption of the “reasonable victim” standard).
4. 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
5. 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).
6. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
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assment and, at the same time, afford more protection for Alaska
employers from costly litigation.
Because this proposal applies only to Alaska employers and
Alaska state courts, for the purposes of the discussion of whether
the Alaska Supreme Court should allow employers to state an af-
firmative defense to vicarious liability for the sexual harassment
claims of their employees, this Note refers to employers and em-
ployees as defined in Alaska Statutes section 18.80.300.8  The
Alaska Supreme Court has determined that Alaska’s anti-
discrimination statute, Alaska Statutes section 18.80.220, is “‘mod-
eled on’ the federal law, thus making federal case law relevant.”9
Therefore, in setting forth this proposal, this Note makes liberal
use of federal case law as well as law review articles interpreting Ti-
tle VII for sexual harassment claims.
This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part I briefly traces the his-
torical development of sexual harassment law under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10  Part II analyzes the beginning of
sexual harassment case law in the Alaska Supreme Court by dis-
cussing the court’s decisions in French v. Jadon, Inc.,11 VECO, Inc.
v. Rosebrock12 and Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski.13  Part III analyzes the
benefits of applying the “reasonable victim” standard in the Alaska
Supreme Court’s determinations of the offensiveness of an em-
ployer’s conduct.  This analysis is done through a discussion of
relevant law review articles, federal sexual harassment decisions,14
and an analysis of the Alaska Supreme Court’s decisions in French,
8. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300 (LEXIS 1998).  The statute defines “em-
ployer” as
a person, including the state and a political subdivision of the state, who
has one or more employees in the state but does not include a club that is
exclusively social, or a fraternal, charitable, educational, or religious as-
sociation or corporation, if the club, association, or corporation is not or-
ganized for private profit.
Id. § 18.80.300(4).  The statute defines “employee” as “an individual employed by
an employer but does not include an individual employed in the domestic service
of any person.”  Id. § 18.80.300(3).  These definitions will be applied by the Alaska
Supreme Court.
9. Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc., 601 P.2d 584, 585 (Alaska 1979).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
11. 911 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1996).
12. 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999).
13. 971 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1999).
14. These cases include Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75
(1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meri-
tor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th
Cir. 1991); and Montero v. AGCO Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
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VECO, and Norcon.  Finally, Part IV recommends allowing Alaska
employers an affirmative defense to vicarious liability for the sex-
ual harassment claims of their employees.  This recommendation is
based on the affirmative defense set forth by the United States Su-
preme Court in Ellerth and Faragher and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) past and revised positions
on employer liability.
II.  TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”15  The primary purpose of
the Civil Rights Act was the “elimination and remediation of race-
based employment decisions.”16  As a result, “sex” was not a pro-
tected class in the original bill.  In fact, only two days prior to the
House of Representatives’ vote on the bill, Representative Howard
W. Smith, a southern Democrat, proposed that the bill be amended
to add “sex” as one of the protected classes in order to defeat the
bill.17  Although “humorous debate, later enshrined as ‘Ladies Day
in the House’” surrounded the amendment, it survived debate and
was incorporated into the Civil Rights Act passed by Congress.18
However, as a consequence of the amendment’s last minute addi-
tion, “[v]irtually no legislative history provides guidance to courts
interpreting the prohibition of sex discrimination.”19  Because of
the lack of legislative history defining sex as a protected class, “dif-
ficulty arose in interpreting the extent to which the Act protected
women against sexual harassment.”20  Determining the contours of
sex discrimination has largely been left to the federal courts, guided
by instruction from the Supreme Court and the EEOC.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(a)(1) (1994).
16. ROBERT BELTON & DIANNE AVERY, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 275 (6th ed.
1999).
17. See 110 CONG. REC. 2,577-2,584 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith).
18. Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a
Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. J. 163, 163 (1991).
19. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991).
20. Deborah B. Goldberg, The Road to Equality: The Application of the Rea-
sonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 2 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J.
195, 196 (1995).
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III.  ALASKA SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
In 1996, in French v. Jadon, Inc., 21 the Alaska Supreme Court
decided its first case defining sexual harassment in the employment
context. Appellant Shelly French brought a sexual harassment suit
against her former employer Jadon, Inc., owner of Chilkoot Char-
lie’s, a popular nightclub in Anchorage.22  French alleged she was
wrongfully terminated because she refused to date her supervisor’s
brother and that her employer’s conduct “in ‘requiring’ her to ‘en-
gage in unethical and illegal activities,’ constituted sex discrimina-
tion” under Alaska Statutes section 18.80.220(a)(1) and (4).23  In its
discussion, the court defined quid pro quo sexual harassment as
“when an employer conditions employment benefits on sexual fa-
vors.”24  The court held that the superior court did not err in
granting Jadon’s summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of
French’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.25  In its discussion
of French’s hostile work environment claim, the court noted that a
hostile work environment is created by “[c]onduct which unrea-
sonably interferes with work performance [that] can alter a condi-
tion of employment and create an abusive working environment.”26
The court held that French failed to articulate clearly her hostile
work environment claim.27  Accordingly, the court affirmed the su-
perior court’s grant of summary judgment.28  The court declined to
decide whether to adopt a “reasonable woman” or a “reasonable
victim” standard for determinations of employee sexual harass-
ment claims.29  The court also noted that Title VII was the “federal
counterpart” to Alaska Statutes section 18.80.220.30  The court
noted, however, that it will “consider federal precedent for guid-
ance” when deciding anti-discrimination cases.31
In 1999, the Alaska Supreme Court decided two cases dealing
with sexual harassment in the employment context: VECO, Inc. v.
21. 911 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1996).
22. See id. at 23.
23. See id. at 26-27.
24. Id. (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991)).
25. See id. at 27.
26. Id. at 28 (quoting Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877).
27. See id. at 29 n.11.
28. See id. at 29.
29. See id. at 28 n.10.  The court cited to numerous federal sexual harassment
decisions, some of which applied the “reasonable person” standard and others
which applied the “reasonable woman” standard.
30. See id. at 28.
31. Id.
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Rosebrock32 and Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski.33  The court held that
Alaska employers could be held vicariously liable for their employ-
ees’ sexual harassment claims under Alaska Statutes section
18.80.220(a).34  Although the cases, particularly VECO,35 clarified a
great deal about employer liability for sexual harassment claims in
the workplace, the court has yet to decide whether Alaska employ-
ers will be able to claim an affirmative defense to vicarious liability
for the sexual harassment claims of their employees.
In VECO, appellee Constance Rosebrock brought a hostile
work environment claim against her employer VECO under
Alaska Statutes section 18.80.220.36  Rosebrock alleged that while
she was employed by VECO, her supervisor Rick Rorick “sexually
propositioned her on several occasions” and “made several explicit
comments about the size of her breasts.”37  Rosebrock also testified
that VECO employee Bill Dropps sexually assaulted her.38  In its
analysis, the Alaska Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in
French by dividing sexual harassment claims into the two catego-
ries traditionally used by federal courts: quid pro quo sexual har-
assment and hostile work environment claims.39  The court defined
quid pro quo sexual harassment as “when an employer ‘conditions
32. 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999).
33. 971 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1999).
34. See VECO, 970 P.2d at 915-17; Norcon, 971 P.2d at 165-66.  Alaska Stat-
utes section 18.80.220(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or to
discriminate against a person in compensation or in a term, condition, or
privilege of employment because of the person’s race, religion, color, or
national origin, or because of the person’s age, physical or mental dis-
ability, sex, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, or par-
enthood when the reasonable demands of the position do not require dis-
tinction on the basis of age, physical or mental disability, sex, marital
status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, or parenthood.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a) (LEXIS 1998).
35. The Norcon opinion includes a very limited analysis of sexual harassment
law.  The majority of the case is dedicated to Kotowski’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims, her negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, the
possible preemption of her claims by the Labor Management Relationship Act,
and analysis of her punitive and compensatory damages.  See 971 P.2d at 165-66,
171-72, 177-78.
36. See 970 P.2d at 908-10.
37. Id. at 909.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 910.  In Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court held
that “‘[q]uid pro quo’ and ‘hostile work environment’ do not appear in the statu-
tory text [of Title VII].  The terms appeared first in the academic literature.”  524
U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (citing CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN 32-47 (1979)).
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employment benefits on sexual favors . . . [by relying] upon his or
her authority ‘to extort sexual consideration from an employee.’”40
Using the Supreme Court’s definition in the Ellerth case, the court
defined hostile work environment to include “‘unfulfilled threats’
or ‘offensive conduct in general.’”41  Again, the court declined to
decide whether or not to adopt the “reasonable woman” standard
for determination of the severity and pervasiveness of an em-
ployer’s conduct and instead used the “reasonable person” stan-
dard.42
The court proceeded to outline the development of sexual
harassment law by utilizing the Restatement (Second) of Agency’s
definition of “scope of employment”43 and the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Title VII44 in some of the Supreme
Court’s most important employment discrimination decisions.45
The court held VECO vicariously liable for Rosebrock’s hostile
work environment claim regardless of whether VECO “knew or
should have known about the harassment.”46
In Norcon, appellee Mary Kotowski sued her employer Nor-
con for sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.47  Kotowski al-
40. VECO, 970 P.2d at 910 (quoting French v. Jadon, Inc., 911 P.2d 20, 26
(Alaska 1996) (quoting Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 771, 777 (D.
Nev. 1992)).
41. Id. at 910 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753).
42. See id. at 915 n.21; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
43. See VECO, 970 P.2d at 910 n.7 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 228 (1958)).  The Restatement defines “scope of employment” as
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially
within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in
part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally
used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable
by the master.  (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of em-
ployment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the
authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to
serve the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228.  Title VII’s definition of “employer”
includes “any agent of such [employer];” thus common law agency principles ap-
ply.  See infra note 142.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
45. See VECO, 970 P.2d at 912-21.  These decisions include Burlington Indus.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
46. 970 P.2d at 914.
47. See 971 P.2d 158, 161 (Alaska 1999).
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leged that while working for Norcon, foreman Mike Posehn kissed
her on the lips, squeezed her buttocks, and once, while dressed
only in his underwear, invited her to spend the night with him.48
The superior court instructed the jury on hostile work environment
sexual harassment and asked them to find whether Kotowski
proved the following:
(1) that she was subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, (2)
that this conduct was unwelcome, (3) that the conduct was suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plain-
tiff’s employment and to create an abusive working environ-
ment, and (4) that she suffered damages as a result of the sexual
harassment.49
The jury was also instructed on quid pro quo sexual harassment
and asked to find whether Kotowski proved
(1) that she was subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2)
that this conduct was unwelcome; and (3) either (a) that submis-
sion to such conduct was made either explicitly or implicitly, a
term or condition of her employment, or (b) that her submission
or rejection of such conduct was used as the basis for an em-
ployment decision or decisions affecting her employment; and
(4) that she suffered damages as a result of the sexual harass-
ment.50
Norcon challenged the jury instructions on appeal; the supreme
court held that they were not erroneous and were properly given to
the jury.51  The court also affirmed that it recognized a private right
of action under Alaska Statutes section 18.80.220.52  Finally, the
court held that Alaska Statutes section 18.80.220 confers upon em-
ployees the right to a non-discriminatory workplace that “could not
be waived by any contrary contractual provision.”53
IV.  THE “REASONABLE VICTIM” STANDARD
A. Federal Case Law
The United States Supreme Court issued its first major ruling
on sexual harassment in 1986 in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.54
48. See id. at 161-62.
49. Id. at 171.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 165 n.4 (citing Ratcliff v. Security Nat’l Bank, 670 P.2d 1139,
1142 (Alaska 1983)).
53. Id. at 165.
54. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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In that case, Mechelle Vinson brought a hostile work environment
sexual harassment claim against her employer, Meritor Savings
Bank, for the sexually harassing behavior of Meritor’s vice presi-
dent, Sidney Taylor.55  Vinson alleged that she submitted to Tay-
lor’s “repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, usually at the
[bank] branch, both during and after business hours [and] . . . esti-
mated that over the next several years she had intercourse with him
some 40 or 50 times” because she feared losing her job.56
The Court found Meritor liable and in reaching this determi-
nation recognized for the first time the “hostile environment the-
ory” of sexual harassment.57  The Court held that the district court’s
inquiry as to whether Vinson’s conduct was “voluntary” was erro-
neous and that the proper inquiry should have been whether or not
the alleged harassing conduct was “unwelcome.”58  The Court also
emphasized that the “language of Title VII is not limited to ‘eco-
nomic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination.”59  The Court held that conduct
that has the “purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual’s work performance” creates a hostile working environ-
ment.60  The Court held that “a plaintiff may establish a violation of
Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a
hostile or abusive work environment.”61
In the U.S. Supreme Court’s second decision, Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.,62 petitioner Teresa Harris brought an “abusive work
environment” claim against her employer Forklift Systems. 63  Har-
ris alleged that during her employment, Forklift’s president Charles
Hardy “often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos”
and told her, among other things, she was “a dumb ass woman,”
and that she and Hardy should “go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate
Harris’ raise.”64  The Court admitted that the test used to measure
the offensiveness of an employer’s conduct “is not, and by its na-
ture cannot be, a mathematically precise test.”65  In order to aid its
55. See id. at 59-60.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 66 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
58. See id. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
59. Id. at 64.
60. Id. at 65.  The Court adopted the definition of hostile work environment
sexual harassment given by the EEOC in its 1980 guidelines on discrimination
based on sex.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
61. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
62. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
63. Id. at 19.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 22.
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determination, the Court stated it would look at all the circum-
stances surrounding the conduct, including the “frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threat-
ening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”66
The Court held that Title VII is violated when the workplace
environment “would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as
hostile or abusive.”67  The Court held that Title VII was not limited
to economic or tangible discrimination, but that the phrase “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment” within the language of Ti-
tle VII “evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spec-
trum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment.”68
The Court held that the district court erred in solely analyzing
whether “the conduct ‘seriously affect[ed] plaintiff’s psychological
well-being’ or led her to ‘suffe[r] injury.’”69  In reversing, the Court
found the district court’s erroneous standards might have wrongly
influenced its decision and thus remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings.70
The Supreme Court has left many of the details of a determi-
nation of sexual harassment to the lower courts.  Although the
Court has applied the “reasonable person” standard in most of its
sexual harassment decisions, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services71 the Court applied a standard that “judged [plaintiffs]
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s posi-
tion.”72  However, the Court has not formally acknowledged the
“reasonable victim” standard as the standard lower courts should
use for sexual harassment determinations.  Some, including Justice
Thomas in his dissenting opinions in both Burlington Industries v.
Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, find it problematic that
the Court has left this to the lower courts.73  Unlike the Supreme
Court, the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady decided to adopt the
“reasonable victim” standard, instead of the default “reasonable
person” standard in their sexual harassment determinations.74
66. Id. at 23.
67. Id. at 22.
68. Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64).
69. Id. at 22.
70. See id. at 23.
71. 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that same-sex harassment is actionable under
Title VII).
72. Id. at 81.
73. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
74. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 1991).
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In Ellison, plaintiff Kerry Ellison brought a hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claim against her employer under Title
VII.75  Ellison alleged that, during her employment with the IRS,
her co-worker Sterling Gray repeatedly pestered her for lunch and
wrote her letters, including statements telling Ellison that he “cried
over [her]” and he knew she was “worth knowing with or without
sex.”76  The Ninth Circuit applied the “reasonable woman” stan-
dard and held that a “female plaintiff states a prima facie case of
hostile work environment sexual harassment when she alleges con-
duct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create
an abusive working environment.”77  However, the court noted that
the “reasonable man” standard would be applied if the plaintiff
were a male.78  The court reasoned it was necessary to use a rela-
tive, bifurcated standard because of the difference in sensibilities
between the sexes.79  The court held that the “sex-blind reasonable
person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systemati-
cally ignore the experiences of women”; however, “[t]he reason-
able woman standard does not establish a higher level of protection
for women than [for] men.”80
B. The Alaska Supreme Court
One of the most notable segments of the Alaska Supreme
Court’s opinion in VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock81 is the court’s asser-
tion that Alaska Statutes section 18.80.220 “is intended to be more
broadly interpreted than federal law to further the goal of eradica-
tion of discrimination.”82  Similarly, in Faragher, the U.S. Supreme
Court held Title VII’s “‘primary objective,’ like that of any statute
meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide redress but
75. See id. at 873.
76. Id. at 874.
77. Id. at 879.
78. See id. at 879 n.11.
79. See id. at 879.
80. Id.
81. 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999).
82. Id. at 912-13 (quoting Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc., 601 P.2d 584,
585 (Alaska 1979)); see also BELTON & AVERY, supra note 16, at 275.  Frequently,
state anti-discrimination statutes will “extend discrimination protection to catego-
ries not covered under federal laws; for example, some states and municipalities
prohibit discrimination in employment because of marital status, sexual orienta-
tion, or physical appearance.”  Id. at 35.
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to avoid harm.”83  Courts should analyze the offensiveness of an
employer’s conduct in such a manner as to maximize the avoidance
of harm for those employees who bring valid sexual harassment
claims against their employers.  Alaska Statutes section 18.80.220,
like Title VII, would better protect Alaska employers from harmful
and undeserved sexual harassment claims and litigation if Alaska
employers were allowed to claim an affirmative defense to vicari-
ous liability for sexual harassment claims where they have per-
formed reasonably under the circumstances.  Keeping this in mind,
how will this affect the Alaska Supreme Court’s analysis when it is
presented with a case in which a woman brings a sexual harassment
claim against an employer who in turn asserts an affirmative de-
fense to vicarious liability for sexual harassment?  What should the
court’s “broader interpretation” of Alaska Statutes section
18.80.220 encompass?84
At least one court85 has suggested that when analyzing the se-
verity and pervasiveness of an employer’s allegedly harassing con-
duct, courts should utilize a relative, “reasonable victim” standard
similar to the one used in Ellison v. Brady, 86 which takes the vic-
tim’s gender into account.  Presumably, this would achieve the twin
goals of a broader interpretation of Alaska Statutes section
18.80.220 and avoiding further harm to litigants.  The fact that the
Alaska Supreme Court has yet to consider this issue demonstrates
the court’s opportunity to improve the future of Alaska anti-
discrimination case law by applying the “reasonable victim” stan-
dard in determinations of the offensiveness of an employer’s con-
duct.  By using the “reasonable victim” standard for victims of sex-
ual harassment, the court, unlike those applying the male-biased
“reasonable person” standard, will be using truly impartial analyses
instead of “systematically ignor[ing] the experiences of women.”87
In her article on the application of the “reasonable woman”
standard in sexual harassment cases, Deborah Goldberg asserts
that although the “reasonable person” standard is meant to be
gender-neutral, “we live in a male-oriented society and the stan-
dard tends to lean towards the male point of view. . . . [thus] ig-
nor[ing] the perspective of a woman in a crime most often perpe-
83. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998) (citing Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
84. See VECO, 970 P.2d at 912-13.
85. See Yates v. Avco Corp.,  819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987).
86. 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991).
87. Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994
U. ILL. L. REV. 769, 798 (1994) (citing Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879).
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trated against women.”88  For this reason, this Note proposes that
the Alaska Supreme Court apply the “reasonable victim” standard
in their determinations of reasonableness in sexual harassment
cases.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to use gender-conscious reason-
ableness standards in sexual harassment cases is one the Alaska
Supreme Court should follow in determining the severity and per-
vasiveness of an employer’s conduct.  By simply replacing the word
“person” with the word “victim” in the elements for “hostile work
environment” and “quid pro quo” sexual harassment claims, the
instructions thus lose much of their gender bias and conform to the
goal enunciated in VECO: a broader reading of Alaska Statutes
section 18.80.220.89  Therefore, to borrow the jury instructions from
Norcon, the proper inquiry in hostile work environment determina-
tions would be whether a reasonable victim would find the alleged
conduct unwelcome and severe or pervasive enough to create a
hostile work environment.90  In quid pro quo sexual harassment de-
terminations, the inquiry would turn on whether a reasonable vic-
tim would find the alleged sexual advances and/or requests unwel-
come.91
The “reasonable victim” standard for female victims of sexual
harassment would “addre[ss] directly the perceived harm of sexual
harassment, redefining what is acceptable in the workplace from
the perspective of the oppressed rather than of the oppressor.”92
According to the EEOC Compliance Manual, courts should focus
on the perspective of the victim and not “stereotyped notions of
acceptable behavior.”93  Doesn’t this suggest that courts should use
a standard as close to the victim’s (rather than society’s) perspec-
tive as possible?  As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Ellison, male vic-
tims of sexual harassment would be judged under the “reasonable
man” standard.94  In the case of female complainants, however, the
“reasonable woman” standard would be applied instead, since the
“reasonable person” standard enforces a fictitious “normative as-
sessment of what is acceptable workplace behavior.”95  In a pro-
88. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 200.
89. See VECO, 970 P.2d at 912-13; text accompanying note 82.
90. See Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, 971 P.2d 158, 171 (Alaska 1999).
91. See id.
92. KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 510 (2d ed. 1998).
93. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (CCH) § 615, ¶ 3115 at 3243 (1999).
94. See 924 F.2d at 879 n.11.
95. Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment,
83 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1184 (1995).
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posal for the implementation of her “rational woman” test, Gillian
Hadfield notes that the “rational woman” test is “focused on
women because it is women’s responses to a practice that only they
must endure that defines the practice as discriminatory.”96
In order to make a proper determination in a sexual harass-
ment case whether an employer’s conduct is unwelcome, the ra-
tional woman’s perspective (or the rational man’s perspective when
the victim is a man) is the only fair perspective from which to
measure a defendant employer’s conduct.97  The court in Ellison
aptly notes “[c]onduct that many men consider unobjectionable
may offend many women.”98  For most women it can be argued that
sexual harassment in the workplace “is as familiar as an intrusive
neighbor at the back door.”99  If the Alaska Supreme Court does
not evaluate the employer’s conduct using a “reasonable victim”
standard, will it be abiding by its promise in VECO to “further the
goal of eradication of discrimination”?100  If the court chooses, as
others before it have, to apply the “reasonable person” standard to
all sexual harassment plaintiffs regardless of their sex, the court will
be imposing society’s narrow, male-dominated perspective onto
female sexual harassment victims.
V.  EMPLOYERS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO VICARIOUS
LIABILITY
A. Federal Case Law
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,101 the U.S. Supreme Court
did not address employers’ affirmative defense to vicarious liability
in great detail, except to state that it rejected the view that “the
mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against dis-
crimination, coupled with [an employee’s] failure to invoke that
procedure, [should] insulate [an employer] from liability.”102  The
Court went on to point out the inadequacies of Meritor’s policy
against discrimination, including the policy’s failure to address sex-
ual harassment in particular and the requirement that employees
96. Id. at 1185.
97. See id.
98. 924 F.2d at 878.
99. BELTON & AVERY, supra note 16, at 275 (quoting B. Glenn George, The
Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993)).
100. VECO, 970 P.2d at 912-13 (citing Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc.,
601 P.2d 584, 585 (Alaska 1979)).
101. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
102. Id. at 72.
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report their complaints to their supervisor, who in this case was the
alleged perpetrator.103
After Meritor, but prior to the Supreme Court’s next sexual
harassment decision, Congress overhauled Title VII in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.104  The Act made additional remedies available
to plaintiffs by providing for damages with statutory caps under Ti-
tle VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation
Act.105  The Act also overturned and modified a series of U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions that were issued during the Court’s 1988
term, including Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,106 because they
weakened “the scope and effectiveness of federal civil rights legis-
lation.”107  However, the Act did not resolve the issue of employers’
affirmative defenses.
In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth108 and Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton,109 the U.S. Supreme Court discussed employers’ af-
firmative defense to vicarious liability for the sexual harassment
claims of their employees.110  In Ellerth, respondent Kimberly El-
lerth sued her former employer, Burlington Industries, as a result
of the sexually harassing behavior of her supervisor, Ted Slowik.111
Ellerth claimed that while employed by Burlington, Slowik’s sexu-
ally harassing behavior towards her could be “construed as threats
to deny her tangible job benefits.”112  The Court held that the real
issue was “whether Burlington ha[d] vicarious liability for Slowik’s
alleged misconduct, rather than liability limited to its own negli-
gence.”113  In its reasoning, the Court applied the Restatement
(Second) of Agency’s central principle: “[a] master is subject to li-
ability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the
scope of their employment.”114  Burlington was held vicariously li-
able for Slowik’s conduct, but the Court noted Burlington should
be allowed to assert an affirmative defense to vicarious liability.115
103. See id. at 72-73.
104. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1994)).
105. See BELTON & AVERY, supra note 16, at 33.
106. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
107. BELTON & AVERY, supra note 16, at 33.
108. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
109. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
110. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-66; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-10.
111. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 749.
112. Id. at 747-48.
113. Id. at 753.
114. Id. at 755-56 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1)
(1957)).
115. See id. at 766.
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In Faragher, petitioner Beth Ann Faragher, who worked as a
lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton, sued her employer for sexual
harassment as a result of the conduct of her supervisors, Bill Terry
and David Silverman.116  Faragher alleged she was subjected to
their “uninvited and offensive touching [and] . . . lewd remarks.”117
Although the City had adopted a policy on sexual harassment, the
Court held that “it completely failed to disseminate its policy
among employees of the Marine Safety Section.”118
In both the Ellerth and Faragher decisions, the Court held that
in order for an employer to claim an affirmative defense to vicari-
ous liability for the sexual harassment claims of their employees, it
must prove “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advan-
tage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”119  The Court in Ellerth also
held that the defense was adopted “[i]n order to accommodate the
agency principles of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of
supervisory authority, as well as Title VII’s equally basic policies of
encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by ob-
jecting employees.”120  Most importantly, the Court held that no af-
firmative defense would be available if the “supervisor’s harass-
ment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as
discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.”121  Thus, the
Court was trying to balance two concerns: (1) the need to curb and
hold employers responsible for the growing problem of sexual har-
assment in the workplace, and (2) the need to make employees
proactive in reporting sexually harassing conduct.
The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Califor-
nia, in Montero v. AGCO Corp.,122 was one of the first federal
courts to apply the new rule for an employer’s affirmative defense
to vicarious liability.  In Montero, plaintiff Carrie Ann Montero
brought a hostile work environment claim under Title VII against
her employer AGCO for the alleged “pattern of offensive and un-
wanted sexual behavior, both verbal and physical,” that she was
subjected to by AGCO employees Glenn Carpenter and Russ
116. See 524 U.S. at 780.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 782 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1560
(S.D. Fla. 1994)).
119. Id. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
120. 524 U.S. at 764.
121. Id. at 765.
122. 19 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
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Newmann.123  The court found that AGCO was not vicariously li-
able for sexual harassment because AGCO successfully proved “it
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly the
sexually harassing behavior,” and Montero “unreasonably failed to
take advantage of the preventive and corrective measures provided
by AGCO.”124
B. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
Congress formed the EEOC to enforce and administer federal
anti-discrimination statutes.125  The EEOC releases guidelines to
assist employers in conforming to the various anti-discrimination
statutes that the Commission is responsible for enforcing.  At first,
the EEOC took a strict liability position on employer liability for
sexual harassment.126  The EEOC’s guidelines in part 1604.11(c) of
Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations held an employer re-
sponsible “for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory em-
ployees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether
the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden
by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of their occurrence.”127  Recently however, the
EEOC rescinded part 1604.11(c), stating that the section was “no
longer valid in light of the Supreme Court’s rulings in Burlington
Industries v. Ellerth . . . and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.”128  The
Commission also released “Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Li-
ability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors” (hereinafter “En-
forcement Guidance”) in order to help employers understand the
effects of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher.129
In “Enforcement Guidance,” the EEOC analyzes in detail the
two prongs of the employers’ affirmative defense to vicarious li-
ability.  In its analysis of an employer’s duty to exercise reasonable
care, the EEOC first notes that such reasonable care requires em-
ployers to “establish, disseminate, and enforce an anti-harassment
policy and complaint procedure and to take other reasonable steps
123. Id. at 1144-45.
124. Id. at 1146.
125. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1 (2000).  Among other responsibilities, the EEOC is
charged with enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
126. See id. § 1604.11(c) (1999).
127. Id.
128. Sex Discrimination Guidelines and National Origin Discrimination
Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,333 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604).
129. See E.E.O.C. Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for
Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615, ¶ 3116,
at 3246-47 (June 18, 1999).
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to prevent and correct harassment.”130  The EEOC also suggests an
employer’s policy should contain certain minimum elements:
A clear explanation of prohibited conduct; Assurance that em-
ployees who make complaints of harassment or provide informa-
tion related to such complaints will be protected against retalia-
tion; A clearly described complaint process that provides
accessible avenues of complaint; Assurance that the employer
will protect the confidentiality of harassment complaints to the
extent possible; A complaint process that provides a prompt,
thorough, and impartial investigation; and Assurance that the
employer will take immediate and appropriate corrective action
when it determines that harassment has occurred.131
The EEOC goes on to examine each of these elements in detail by
giving examples of how to question alleged harassers in a sexual
harassment investigation132 as well as suggesting corrective ac-
tions.133
In its analysis of the second prong of the employers’ affirma-
tive defense—an employee’s duty to exercise reasonable care—the
EEOC asserts that the rationale behind this element is that an em-
ployee has a duty “to use such means as are reasonable under the
circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages” resulting from
harassment.134  One example of an employee’s breach of this duty is
the failure to utilize the employer’s complaint procedure.135  The
employee does not have to prove that the employee’s decision not
to utilize the policy was reasonable; rather, the burden falls on the
employer to prove the employee’s decision was unreasonable.136
The EEOC warns that plaintiff employees who utilize methods
other than the employer’s complaint procedure to avoid harm, e.g.,
filing a prompt complaint with the EEOC, will prevent the em-
ployer from proving the second prong of the affirmative defense.137
C. The Alaska Supreme Court
Although the Alaska Supreme Court did not decide whether
to allow employers to claim an affirmative defense to vicarious li-
ability in VECO, it did mention the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent
decision to adopt an affirmative defense for employers in Ellerth
130. Id. at 3254.
131. Id. at 3255.
132. See id. at 3257-58.
133. See id. at 3259-61.
134. Id. at 3261 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806
(1998)).
135. See id. at 3262.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 3263.
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and Faragher.138  The court noted that since both cases were de-
cided after VECO had already been briefed and argued, “the issue
of the adoption of such a defense was not raised below or on ap-
peal” and the court had “no occasion to consider whether the af-
firmative defense which [the cases] announce should be adopted as
a feature of Alaska anti-discrimination law.”139  More importantly,
the court noted the Ellerth and Faragher decisions were “in several
respects supportive of the views [the court] express[ed] herein as to
the liability of an employer for the harassive acts of a supervisor.”140
Thus, for the analysis of whether the Alaska Supreme Court should
adopt the two-pronged affirmative defense set forth by the Su-
preme Court in Ellerth and Faragher, this Note will demonstrate
the broadness of the Alaska statute for the purposes of interpreta-
tion and the furtherance of the Alaska Legislature’s goal of the
eradication of discrimination.141
A comparison of the definitions of “employer” and “em-
ployee” in Title VII, which the Ninth Circuit applied in Ellison,
with the definitions in Alaska Statutes section 18.80.300, demon-
strates many similarities.  One main difference, however, is the size
of the employer that is included in the definition of “employer” in
the respective statutes.  Title VII defines “employer” as “a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calen-
dar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent
of such a person.”142  Alaska Statutes section 18.80.300 defines
“employer” as “a person, including the state and a political subdivi-
sion of the state, who has one or more employees in the state.”143
Both statutes exclude certain types of employers from being regu-
lated under the statute.  Title VII excludes certain governmental
agencies and private clubs,144 and the Alaska Statutes excludes
138. See VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 914 n.18 (Alaska 1999).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
143. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(4) (LEXIS 1998).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).  Title VII excludes
(1) [T]he United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government
of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the
District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive
service . . . or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a la-
bor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of
title 26, except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons
having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be
considered employers.
Id.
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charitable organizations but does not exclude the state as an em-
ployer.145
Both the Alaska Statutes and Title VII’s definitions of “em-
ployee” begin with the ambiguous phrase “an individual employed
by an employer.”146  The difference between the two statutes is that
Title VII excludes employees of the federal government,147 while
the Alaska Statutes only excludes “individual[s] employed in the
domestic service of any person.”148  This comparison reveals that
the coverage of Alaska’s anti-discrimination statute is broader on
its face than Title VII.
Some critics of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense argue
that one concern with the defense is that “[a]ssuming the employer
meets the first element by acting reasonably, an employer still may
not meet the second element because it is entirely dependent on
the conduct of the harassed employee.”149  One way that the Alaska
Supreme Court could circumvent this concern would be to apply a
very broad interpretation to the second prong of the affirmative
defense.  In Fall v. Indiana University Board of Trustees,150 the dis-
trict court held that it could not say whether the employee’s waiting
for three months before reporting the incident was reasonable or
unreasonable as a matter of law and thus left it for the jury to de-
cide.151  In a more extreme case, the district court in Marsicano v.
American Society of Safety Engineers152 found that, even though
Marsicano had “acted reasonably in availing of the formal preven-
tive procedures available to her,” since she remained silent when a
145. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(4) (LEXIS 1998).  Subsection 4 excludes
any “club that is exclusively social, or a fraternal, charitable, educational, or re-
ligious association or corporation, if the club, association, or corporation is not or-
ganized for private profit.”  Id.
146. Id. § 18.80.300(3); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).  Title VII excludes those individuals who are
elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State
by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to
be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making
level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitu-
tional or legal powers of the office.  The exemption set forth in the pre-
ceding sentence shall not include employees subject to civil service laws
of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision.
Id.
148. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(3).
149. Brian S. Kruse, Note, Strike One—You’re Out! Cautious Employers Lose
Under New Sexual Harassment Law: Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct.
2275 (1998), 78 NEB. L. REV. 444, 464 (1999).
150. 12 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
151. See id. at 884.
152. 1998 WL 603128 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1998).
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supervisor inquired of her well-being after several incidences of of-
fending conduct had already occurred, she “unreasonably failed to
take advantage of a corrective and, more importantly, a preventive
opportunity provided by her employer.”153  Although these deci-
sions may seem harsh, they are in line with Title VII’s aim of re-
quiring employees to “accept responsibility for alerting their em-
ployers to the possibility of harassment.”154
In his dissents in Ellerth and Faragher, Justice Thomas com-
plains that the majority’s affirmative defense “provides shockingly
little guidance about how employers can actually avoid vicarious
liability.”155  Justice Thomas argues the majority “leaves the dirty
work to the lower courts.”156  Justice Thomas also argues that em-
ployers should be subject to the same standard for sexual harass-
ment and racial discrimination, since both are types of employment
discrimination prohibited by Title VII.157  In his dissent in Ellerth,
Justice Thomas argues the Court should “restore parallel treatment
of employer liability for racial and sexual harassment.”158  Instead
of changing the standard for racial discrimination to conform to the
standard set forth by the majority in Ellerth and Faragher, Justice
Thomas suggests that the standard be effectively lowered to hold
employers liable “only if the employer is truly at fault.”159
The disparity of which Justice Thomas complains in the ma-
jority’s affirmative defense can be remedied as nothing prevents a
court from “exten[ding] . . . the vicarious liability analysis to other
types of harassment.”160  The Alaska Supreme Court, in determin-
ing whether to extend the affirmative defense to Alaska employers,
should in no way be persuaded by Justice Thomas’ dissents.
Adopting the affirmative defense would help Alaska courts achieve
153. Id. at *7.
154. Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding
that an employee who “feared unspecified repercussions and an unpleasant out-
come” cannot be excused from his failure to follow his employer’s grievance pro-
cedure).
155. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 773 (1998) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting); accord Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 810 (1998) (Tho-
mas, J., dissenting).
156. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 773.
157. See id. at 774.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. William R. Corbett, Faragher, Ellerth, and the Federal Law of Vicarious
Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors: Something Lost, Something
Gained, and Something to Guard Against, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 801, 815-16
n.79 (1999) (citing Booker v. Budget Rent-a-Car Sys., 17 F. Supp. 2d 735 (M.D.
Tenn. 1998) (applying the holding in Ellerth and Faragher to racial harassment)).
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their goal of a broader interpretation of Alaska Statutes section
18.80.220.161  In applying the affirmative defense to Alaska’s sexual
harassment cases, the Alaska courts will be able to come closer to
this goal.  This Note does not suggest that the Alaska Supreme
Court adopt the affirmative defense without first properly analyz-
ing and perhaps changing the respective prongs to conform to the
lofty goals of the state’s anti-discrimination policies.  In order to
make the affirmative defense an effective protection against un-
necessary litigation and other harms for employers, it may first
have to be edited as the Alaska Supreme Court deems necessary.
As William Corbett suggests, the amendment process simply would
recognize that the majority in Ellerth and Faragher did not intend
for “vicarious liability analyses [to be] ‘one size fits all.’”162
VI.  CONCLUSION
In the Alaska Supreme Court’s inevitable determinations
whether to apply the “reasonable victim” standard and whether to
allow Alaska employers to claim the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense, the court should follow the path of VECO: Alaska’s anti-
discrimination law “is intended to be more broadly interpreted
than federal law to further the goal of eradication of discrimina-
tion.”163  Applying the “reasonable victim” standard not only helps
plaintiffs, but also helps the justice system as a whole by defeating
societal stereotypes perpetuated by the application of the “reason-
able person” standard.
By allowing defendant employers to claim an affirmative de-
fense to the sexual harassment claims of their employees, the court
would help protect cautious, law-abiding employers from frivolous
claims.  The second prong of the defense would require employees
to report sexually harassing conduct to their employers promptly,
and at the same time, require employers to eliminate harassing
conduct in the workplace swiftly or risk discipline in court.
Kamla Alexander
161. See VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 912-13 (Alaska 1999); see also
supra note 82 and accompanying text.
162. Corbett, supra note 160, at 822.
163. VECO, 970 P.2d at 912-13 (quoting Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc.,
601 P.2d 584, 585 (Alaska 1979)); see also BELTON & AVERY, supra note 16, at 275
(stating that frequently, state anti-discrimination statutes will “extend discrimina-
tion protection to categories not covered under federal laws; for example, some
states and municipalities prohibit discrimination in employment because of mari-
tal status, sexual orientation, or physical appearance”).
